Inexiste trabalho que esclareça de fato o que vem a ser uma teoria neo-institucional da mudança e quais os elementos fundamentais para comparar-se, avaliar e construir tais teorias. O artigo propõe-se a refletir sobre esse problema. Realiza-se uma análise comparada ente quatro teorias tradicionais da mudança no novo institucionalismo. A análise apresenta os pontos de convergência e controvérsia no que diz respeito ao problema da endogeneidade, o papel das instituições formais e institucionais, padrões típicos de explicação, mecanismos causais e modos de causação típicos dos modelos neoinstitucionais. O propósito central é compreender como essas quatro abordagens tradicionais da mudança respondem aos desafios de promover a explicação dos processos de transformação institucional a partir das instituições. O estudo vai além de uma simples análise comparada de teorias e busca oferecer, de modo preliminar, um método de análise de teoria que crie condições possíveis para explorar dimensões essenciais das abordagens disponíveis sobre o problema da mudança institucional a partir do novo institucionalismo. Que elementos seriam constitutivos para representar efetivamente uma teoria neo-institucional? O método utilizado é construído a partir de problemas considerados fundamentais no avanço de uma teoria institucional. Para tanto, considera-se que um dos passos iniciais para a construção das teorias da mudança institucional seria associado, em tese, ao crescimento da demanda de análises comparativas de teorias, no sentido de compreender mais de perto quais seriam os problemas e os refinamentos necessários para a construção de teorias.

At present there is a paucity of work that seeks to clarify what a neo-institutional theory of change is and what the fundamental elements to compare, evaluate and construct such a theory would be. The present paper proposes reflections on this issue. We carry out comparative analysis of four neoinstitutionalist theories of social change. We present points of convergence and controversy regarding the problem of endogeneity, the role of formal and informal institutions, typical explanatory patterns, causal mechanisms and the causal modes that typify different neo-institutional models. Our main goal is to understand how these four traditional approaches to change respond to the challenge to explain processes of institutional change starting from institutions themselves. The study goes beyond a simple comparative analysis of theories and seeks to offer, in a preliminary sense, a method for the analysis of theory that makes it possible to explore the essential dimensions of available approaches to institutional change through the new institutionalism. What are the constitutive elements that make up an institutional theory per se? The method we use is constructed starting from the problems that are considered fundamental in the advancement of an institutional theory. For these purposes, we suggest that the one of the initial steps in the construction of theories of institutional change can be seen as associated with the growth of a demand for comparative analysis of theories, in the sense of a closer understanding of the problems entailed and refinement needed for the building such theories.

Il n'y a pas de travail qui éclaircisse en effet ce qui est une théorie néo-institutionnelle du changement et quels seraient les éléments fondamentaux à être comparés, évalués, et enfin, qui construisent ces théories. L'article propose une réflexion sur ce problème. Une analyse comparée de quatre théories néo-institutionnelles est réalisée. L'analyse présente les points de convergence et de controverse en ce qui concerne le problème de l'endogénéité, le rôle des institutions formelles et institutionnelles, les modèles typiques d'explication, les mécanismes de causalité et les modes de causalité typiques des modèles néo-intitutionnels. Le but central, c'est de comprendre comment ces quatre approches traditionnelles du changement répondent aux défis de promouvoir l'explication des processus de transformation institutionnelle à partir des institutions. L'étude n'est pas simplement une analyse comparée de théories et cherche à offrir, de façon préliminaire, une méthode d'analyse théorique qui favorise les conditions pour explorer des dimensions essentielles des approches disponibles sur le problème du changement institutionnel à partir du nouvel institutionnalisme. Quels éléments seraient constitutifs pour représenter effectivement une théorie néo-institutionnelle? La méthode utilisée est construite à partir de certains problèmes considérés fondamentaux pour le progrès d'une théorie institutionnelle. Pour cela, on considère qu'une des démarches initiales pour la construction des théories du changement institutionnel serait associée, en thèse, à la croissance de la demande d'analyses comparatives des théories, dans le sens où il serait possible de comprendre de plus près les problèmes et les raffinements nécessaires pour la construction des théories.

Este artigo analisa três inovações analíticas produzidas pela segunda geração do novo institucionalismo histórico sobre o problema da mudança na ciência política comparada. A análise reside na compreensão das alternativas encontradas para superar os limites tradicionais dos modelos centrados em premissas de estabilidade e ênfase causal nos fatores exógenos. O argumento é de que a segunda geração de pesquisas tem produzido um conjunto de sensíveis transformações analíticas e conceituais, incluindo novos conceitos, categorias analíticas e mecanismos causais para compreender a mudança de forma mais apropriada.

This paper explores three core analytical innovations: Lieberman (2002), Greif (2006), and Mahoney and Thelen (2010), produced by the second generation of historical new institutionalism about endogenous institutional change. It explores the logic of the key conceptual and analytical transformations in the recent methodological debate over issues on how to expand the explanatory powers of traditional models overcoming the exogeneity and stability bias problems. The main argument is that there is a substantial set of transformations coming through in the new institutional agenda via the introduction of new conceptualizations, theoretical frameworks and, fundamentally, through the consideration of a new set of causal mechanisms that allows new models to expand and deepen the analysis of institutional change mainly taking into account institutional causes.

Cet article analyse trois innovations analytiques produites par la seconde génération du nouvel institutionnalisme historique à propos du problème du changement dans la science politique comparée. L'analyse réside sur la compréhension des alternatives rencontrées pour dépasser les limites traditionnelles des modèles centrés sur des prémisses de stabilité et de l'accent de causalité sur les facteurs exogènes. L'argument est celui selon lequel la seconde génération de recherches produit un ensemble d'importantes transformations analytiques et conceptuelles, incluant de nouveaux concepts, des catégories analytiques et des mécanismes de causalité pour comprendre le changement de forme le plus appropriée.

O artigo discute as bases de fundamentação para o emprego de estudos de caso na ciência política comparada. O argumento básico é o de que existe amplo lugar para o desenvolvimento dos estudos de caso. Este argumento é construído a partir da análise comparada de três das principais razões fortes para fundamentar e validar os estudos de caso na tradição qualitativa de pesquisa comparada: as noções de equifinalidade; process-tracing; e as explicações por mecanismos causais. Centrados nestes princípios, a nova geração de comparativistas mostra que os estudos de caso continuam a ser relevantes para: ampliar a conexão entre teoria e base empírica; o desenvolvimento de explicações e inferências causais; e, por fim, para a construção de teorias.

This paper discusses the theoretical foundations for using case studies in comparative political science. It makes the claim about the continuous demand for using case study research designs. This argument is built upon three major claims for validation of this approach: the equifinality; process-tracing, and the explanation by mechanisms. Based on these assumptions, a new generation of researchers in qualitative political science points out that case study methodology continues to be relevant for: enlarging the connection between theory and evidence; the development of explanations and causal inferences in comparative politics; and, for theory construction.

This essay discusses the problem of endogenous institutional change in the context of the new historical institutionalism. It reviews the critique of traditional theorizing on institutional change and offers a comparative analysis of innovative approaches to institutional change on the contemporary agenda of historical institutionalism in comparative political science. The analysis focuses on the logic underlying the conceptual and analytical transformations in the methodological debate of how to expand the explanatory capacity of traditional models by introducing institutional variables in them. We review quasi-parametric models, incremental change models and those models seeking to introduce the dynamic interaction between ideas and institutions. The key argument is that, over this decade, institutional change models, driven by the introduction of new concepts, new modes of theorizing, and new mechanisms of change, have undergone a remarkable analytical transformation. These innovations have allowed political scientists to deal with change endogenously. science them quasiparametric quasi parametric institutions that decade concepts transformation endogenously

O trabalho focaliza o problema dos limites da construção das novas burocracias gerenciais, no contexto das reformas administrativas contemporâneas. O argumento central é o de que de as reformas gerenciais encontram considerável dificuldade para estabelecer os novos modelos institucionais orientados pela performance devido à preponderância do ajuste fiscal. A construção do argumento é baseada em dois níveis complementares de análise. O primeiro abrange evidências comparativas produzidas por estudos e pesquisas que analisaram os limites da implementação de reformas gerenciais da administração pública em diversos países e diversas condições. O segundo focaliza nas razões específicas da não implementação das novas burocracias orientadas pela performance no contexto da estratégia de reforma administrativa gerencial perseguida pelo Governo Federal brasileiro em 1995.

The article focuses on the question of the limits for the development of new management bureaucracies within the context of contemporary administrative reforms. The central argument is that the management reforms encounter considerable difficulties in establishing the new performance driven institutional models, due to the preponderance of the fiscal adjustment. The construction of the argument is based on two complementary levels of analysis. The first level deals with comparative evidences provided by studies and researches that examined the limits of the implementation of management reforms of public administration in different countries and conditions. The second level focuses on the specific reasons for not implementing the new performance driven bureaucracies in the strategy of management administrative reform pursued by the Brazilian Federal Government in 1995.

This article analyses the core critiques on institutional change theories within the neoinstitutional research agenda in comparative political science. It offers an explanatory typology using analytical challenges for the development of theories with new institutional approaches. This typology provides key critical issues that should be seriously considered by political scientists when analysing change. The framework suggests that the analytical challenges be posed in five interwoven dimensions: a) inclusion of institutional variables; b) agency and cognition; c) contextual sensitivity; d) increasing precision in the concept of institution (and institutional change); and, e) recursive interaction between agents and institutions in the process of institutional change. Based on these challenges, the article conducts a comparative analysis of the theories of change suggested by North and Aoki to understand how they deal with such issues.

This article analyses the core critiques on institutional change theories within the neoinstitutional research agenda in comparative political science. It offers an explanatory typology using analytical challenges for the development of theories with new institutional approaches. This typology provides key critical issues that should be seriously considered by political scientists when analysing change. The framework suggests that the analytical challenges be posed in five interwoven dimensions: a) inclusion of institutional variables; b) agency and cognition; c) contextual sensitivity; d) increasing precision in the concept of institution (and institutional change); and, e) recursive interaction between agents and institutions in the process of institutional change. Based on these challenges, the article conducts a comparative analysis of the theories of change suggested by North and Aoki to understand how they deal with such issues. science approaches dimensions variables b cognition c sensitivity d change) e

O artigo desenvolve uma análise comparativa de teorias sobre o fenômeno da expansão dos gastos públicos produzidos pela Economia Política nos últimos 25 anos. A análise busca identificar os principais mecanismos causais e as variáveis utilizadas pelas explicações rivais e complementares que integram a matriz de argumentações contemporâneas sobre tal fenômeno.

This paper develops a comparative analysis of key political economic approaches about the growth of public expenditures in the last 25 years. The main purpose of the analysis is to identify the key causal mechanisms and variables embedded in these theoretical frameworks in order to construct a main typology of explanatory possibility about the expansion of public expenditures in modern societies.

O artigo focaliza a explicação da falha seqüencial nas reformas gerenciais. Ele trata do problema dos limites do ajuste gerencial, em uma abordagem que tenta conectar teoria e dados empíricos, articulando três níveis de análise. O primeiro nível apresenta evidências comparativas da falha seqüencial das reformas nos governos nacionais a partir de um conjunto de indicadores voltados para compreender transformações no papel dos estados. O segundo nível analítico identifica, à luz da análise de um conjunto representativo de estudos comparativos da implementação de reformas, quatro mecanismos típicos presentes na explicação das falhas do ajuste gerencial. Busca-se configurar uma matriz explicativa de teorias sobre a falha seqüencial. Em seguida discute-se a experiência da reforma gerencial no contexto brasileiro, conferindo especial atenção para um dos mecanismos geradores da falha: o dilema do controle. As principais hipóteses são que guiam o artigo são que as reformas falham sequencialmente e existem pelo menos quatro mecanismos causais que produzem as reformas: a) custos de transação envolvidos na produção das reformas; b) legados de desempenho; c) preponderância do ajuste fiscal e d) o dilema do controle. Esses mecanismos atuam isolada ou combinadamente, reduzindo consideravelmente as chances de transformações do papel do Estado nos moldes gerenciais. As principais evidências analisadas no artigo permitem tornar consistente o argumento geral de que as reformas falharam nas tentativas de reduzir os gastos públicos, alterar padrões de alocação de recursos, reduzir a força de trabalho e transformar o papel do Estado. A principal conclusão é que as reformas falharam seqüencialmente e o ajuste gerencial exibe consideráveis limites, especialmente de natureza política.

This article focuses on explanations for sequential faults in administrative reform. It deals with the limits of managerial adjustment in an approach that attempts to connect theory and empirical data, articulating three levels of analysis. The first level presents comparative evidence of sequential fault within reforms in national governments through a set of indicators geared toward understanding changes in the role of the state. In light of analyses of a representative set of comparative studies on reform implementation, the second analytical level proceeds to identify four typical mechanisms that are present in explanations on managerial adjustment faults. In this way, we seek to configure an explanatory matrix for theories on sequential fault. Next we discuss the experience of management reform in the Brazilian context, conferring special attention on one of the mechanisms that creates fault: the control dilemma. The major hypotheses that guide our article are that reforms lead to sequential fault and that there are at least four causal mechanisms that produce reforms: a) transactions costs involved in producing reforms; b) performance legacy; c) predominance of fiscal adjustment and d) the control dilemma. These mechanisms act separately or in concert, and act to decrease chances for a transformation of State managerial patterns. Major evidence that is analyzed in these articles lend consistency to the general argument that reforms have failed in their attempts to reduce public expenses, alter patterns of resource allocation, reduce the labor force and change the role of the State. Our major conclusion is that reforms fail sequentially and managerial adjustment displays considerable limitations, particularly those of a political nature.

L'article est centré sur l'explication de la défaillance séquentielle dans les réformes de gestion. Il traite du problème des limites de l'ajustement de gestion, dans une approche visant relier théorie et données empiriques et articulant trois niveaux d'analyse. Le premier niveau présente des évidences comparatives de la défaillance séquentielle des réformes dans les gouvernements nationaux à partir d'un ensemble d'indicatifs permettant de comprendre les transformations dans le rôle des états. Le deuxième niveau analytique identifie, à la lumière de l'analyse d'un ensemble représentatif d'études comparatifs de mise en oeuvre de réformes, quatre mécanismes typiques présents dans l'explication des défaillances de l'ajustement de gestion. On cherche à établir une matrice explicative de théories sur la défaillance séquentielle. Ensuite, on discute de l'expérience de la réforme de gestion dans le contexte brésilien, en consacrant une attention spéciale à un des mécanismes générateurs de la défaillance : le dilemme du contrôle. Les principales hypothèses qui orientent l'article sont : il y a défaillance séquentiellement des réformes et il existe au moins quatre mécanismes provocateurs qui originent les réformes : a) des coûts de transaction compris dans la production des réformes ; b) legs de la performance ; c) prépondérance de l'ajustement fiscal et d) le dilemme du contrôle. Ces mécanismes agissent seuls ou en combinaison, et réduisent assez bien les chances de transformations du rôle de l'État dans les modèles de gestion. Les principales évidences analysées dans l'article permettent de rendre solide l'argument général selon lequel les réformes sont tombées en défaillance lors des tentatives de réduire les dépenses publiques, de modifier les normes d'allocation de ressources, de réduire la force de travail et de transformer le rôle de l'État. La principale conclusion est que les réformes ont séquentiellement défailli et l'ajustement de gestion exhibe d'importantes limites, surtout à caractère politique.

O artigo analisa a relação entre mudança estrutural e intervenção social do Estado. Ele analisa comparativamente os mecanismos centrais de três teorias contemporâneas que tentam explicar as principais razões pelas quais os gastos sociais se expandem nas sociedades contemporâneas.

This paper discusses the relationship between structural change and social policies. It provides a comparative analysis of the basic mechanisms of three major lines of theoretical reasoning that seeks to explain the main reasons by which governments continue to expand their social expenditures in contemporary societies.

O artigo focaliza a explicação da falha seqüencial nas reformas gerenciais. Ele trata do problema dos limites do ajuste gerencial, em uma abordagem que tenta conectar teoria e dados empíricos, articulando três níveis de análise. O primeiro nível apresenta evidências comparativas da falha seqüencial das reformas nos governos nacionais a partir de um conjunto de indicadores voltados para compreender transformações no papel dos estados. O segundo nível analítico identifica, à luz da análise de um conjunto representativo de estudos comparativos da implementação de reformas, quatro mecanismos típicos presentes na explicação das falhas do ajuste gerencial. Busca-se configurar uma matriz explicativa de teorias sobre a falha seqüencial. Em seguida discute-se a experiência da reforma gerencial no contexto brasileiro, conferindo especial atenção para um dos mecanismos geradores da falha: o dilema do controle. As principais hipóteses são que guiam o artigo são que as reformas falham sequencialmente e existem pelo menos quatro mecanismos causais que produzem as reformas: a) custos de transação envolvidos na produção das reformas; b) legados de desempenho; c) preponderância do ajuste fiscal e d) o dilema do controle. Esses mecanismos atuam isolada ou combinadamente, reduzindo consideravelmente as chances de transformações do papel do Estado nos moldes gerenciais. As principais evidências analisadas no artigo permitem tornar consistente o argumento geral de que as reformas falharam nas tentativas de reduzir os gastos públicos, alterar padrões de alocação de recursos, reduzir a força de trabalho e transformar o papel do Estado. A principal conclusão é que as reformas falharam seqüencialmente e o ajuste gerencial exibe consideráveis limites, especialmente de natureza política.

This article focuses on explanations for sequential faults in administrative reform. It deals with the limits of managerial adjustment in an approach that attempts to connect theory and empirical data, articulating three levels of analysis. The first level presents comparative evidence of sequential fault within reforms in national governments through a set of indicators geared toward understanding changes in the role of the state. In light of analyses of a representative set of comparative studies on reform implementation, the second analytical level proceeds to identify four typical mechanisms that are present in explanations on managerial adjustment faults. In this way, we seek to configure an explanatory matrix for theories on sequential fault. Next we discuss the experience of management reform in the Brazilian context, conferring special attention on one of the mechanisms that creates fault: the control dilemma. The major hypotheses that guide our article are that reforms lead to sequential fault and that there are at least four causal mechanisms that produce reforms: a) transactions costs involved in producing reforms; b) performance legacy; c) predominance of fiscal adjustment and d) the control dilemma. These mechanisms act separately or in concert, and act to decrease chances for a transformation of State managerial patterns. Major evidence that is analyzed in these articles lend consistency to the general argument that reforms have failed in their attempts to reduce public expenses, alter patterns of resource allocation, reduce the labor force and change the role of the State. Our major conclusion is that reforms fail sequentially and managerial adjustment displays considerable limitations, particularly those of a political nature.

L'article est centré sur l'explication de la défaillance séquentielle dans les réformes de gestion. Il traite du problème des limites de l'ajustement de gestion, dans une approche visant relier théorie et données empiriques et articulant trois niveaux d'analyse. Le premier niveau présente des évidences comparatives de la défaillance séquentielle des réformes dans les gouvernements nationaux à partir d'un ensemble d'indicatifs permettant de comprendre les transformations dans le rôle des états. Le deuxième niveau analytique identifie, à la lumière de l'analyse d'un ensemble représentatif d'études comparatifs de mise en oeuvre de réformes, quatre mécanismes typiques présents dans l'explication des défaillances de l'ajustement de gestion. On cherche à établir une matrice explicative de théories sur la défaillance séquentielle. Ensuite, on discute de l'expérience de la réforme de gestion dans le contexte brésilien, en consacrant une attention spéciale à un des mécanismes générateurs de la défaillance : le dilemme du contrôle. Les principales hypothèses qui orientent l'article sont : il y a défaillance séquentiellement des réformes et il existe au moins quatre mécanismes provocateurs qui originent les réformes : a) des coûts de transaction compris dans la production des réformes ; b) legs de la performance ; c) prépondérance de l'ajustement fiscal et d) le dilemme du contrôle. Ces mécanismes agissent seuls ou en combinaison, et réduisent assez bien les chances de transformations du rôle de l'État dans les modèles de gestion. Les principales évidences analysées dans l'article permettent de rendre solide l'argument général selon lequel les réformes sont tombées en défaillance lors des tentatives de réduire les dépenses publiques, de modifier les normes d'allocation de ressources, de réduire la force de travail et de transformer le rôle de l'État. La principale conclusion est que les réformes ont séquentiellement défailli et l'ajustement de gestion exhibe d'importantes limites, surtout à caractère politique.

This paper discusses the role of the political and institutional factors in the contemporary theories on the growth of government expenditures. Based on a comparative analysis of studies produced in the two last decades on the field of political economy, the analysis attempts to deal with the main assumptions, the types of explanation, and the causal status of political and institutional variables provided by these theories. The theories are classified according to the type of explanation and the causal primacy of different political and institutional variables in each model.

O artigo tem três diferentes propósitos. Em primeiro lugar, apresenta e discute a questão da crise de implementação das políticas de reforma administrativa. Na seqüência, apresenta uma revisão seletiva das principais teorias contemporâneas que tratam dessa questão. Em seguida, sugere uma teoria adicional, que relaciona a crise de implementação das reformas ao problema dos limites de obtenção da cooperação simultânea com os objetivos programáticos de ajuste fiscal e mudança institucional. A teoria proposta argumenta que a tensão entre maior flexibilidade burocrática, por um lado, e a demanda por maior rigor nos sistemas internos de controles burocráticos, por outro, é um poderoso mecanismo causal que tende a gerar crises sucessivas de implementação de tais políticas. Por tal razão, as reformas tendem a gerar resistência organizada à mudança, problemas de coordenação, problemas de ação coletiva e outros problemas relacionados. O artigo desenvolve o argumento de que, embora tal explicação adquira validade geral para o caso das reformas administrativas, pode ser muito mais crítico para as reformas gerenciais onde a contradição entre os objetivos de ajuste fiscal e mudança institucional é muito mais intensa.

This article has three different objectives. The first is to present and discuss the crisis in the implementation of administrative reform policies. That is followed by a selective review of the main contemporary theories that deal with this issue. Third, another theory is suggested: one which relates the crisis in implementing reforms to the problem of the limits in obtaining cooperation simultaneously with program objectives of fiscal adjustment and institutional change. The theory that is proposed argues that the tension between greater bureaucratic flexibility, on the one hand, and the demand for more rigor in internal systems of bureaucratic control, on the other, is a powerful causal mechanism which tends to generate successive crises in the implementation of such policies. For this reason, reforms tend to generate organized resistance to change, coordinating problems, problems of collective action and so forth. The article puts forth the argument that although this explanation can be considered of general validity with regard to administrative reform, it could prove much more critical for management reforms in which the contradiction between the goals of fiscal adjustment and institutional change is much more intense.

Cet article se compose de trois buts différents: d'abord, il présente la crise d'implémentation des politiques de réforme administrative et en discute. Ensuite, il fait la révision des principales théories contemporaines abordant le sujet. Enfin, il suggère une théorie aditive qui met en rapport la crise d'implémentation des réformes et le problème des limites pour l´obtention de la collaboration simultanée en fonction des objectifs du programme d'ajustement fiscal et changement institutionnel. La théorie proposée prône que la tension entre plus de flexibilité burocratique, d'une part, et la demande d'une plus grande rigueur dans les systèmes internes de contrôle burocratiques, d'autre part, est un puissant mécanisme causal qui tend à générer des crises successives d'implémentation de ces propositions politiques. Aussi les réformes tendentelles à générer une résistance organisée au changement, des problèmes de coordination, des problèmes d'action collective et d'autres problèmes. L'article argumente que, bien que cette explication soit valable d'une façon générale pour le cas des réformes administratives, il se peut que ce soit plus compliqué pour les réformes de gestion où la contradiction entre les objectifs d'ajustement fiscal et le changement intitutionnel est plus intense.

Políticas de reforma administrativa são reconhecidas como casos típicos de políticas públicas que freqüentemente não atingem seus propósitos. A experiência aponta para um esforço continuado de governos no sentido de implementar "novas políticas" para lidar com os crônicos problemas de performance dos aparatos burocráticos. As reformas administrativas são formuladas e, rapidamente, descontinuadas, modificadas, ou abandonadas. A literatura internacional reconhece e fornece um amplo conjunto de explicações para tal fenômeno. Este artigo fornece uma explicação adicional, focalizada na impossibilidade de cooperação dos atores estratégicos para o ajuste fiscal e a mudança institucional. Discutimos também como tal fenômeno ocorreu no caso da implementação da reforma administrativa pelo Ministério da Administração Federal e da Reforma do Estado no período entre 1995 e 1998 no Brasil. A análise revela que o MARE obteve cooperação dos atores estratégicos no interior da burocracia para o ajuste fiscal, enquanto a mudança institucional não obteve o mesmo êxito. Este apoio diferenciado levou o MARE à sua extinção e, posteriormente, na transformação da política de reforma do Estado quatro anos depois de sua criação. Esse caso ilustra com clareza o argumento e lança, com base na teoria da falha permanente, uma explicação de por que as reformas administrativas, e em particular as reformas administrativas em curso nos anos de 1990, centradas na idéia de cost less and work better, representam casos de falha seqüencial.

Public administrative reform policies are known as typical cases of public policies that frequently will not reach its objectives. Experience has pointed to a continued governmental effort aiming at implementing "new policies" in order to deal with the chronic performance shown by the bureaucratic apparatus. Administrative reforms are formulated and quickly discontinued, modified, or simply abandoned. The international literature recognizes and provides a wide range of explanations for such phenomenon. This article provides an additional explanation, focused on the impossibility of cooperation between the strategic components for such fiscal adjust and the institutional change. We also discuss how such phenomenon has happened when implementing the administrative reform by the Federal Administration and State Reform Ministry in Brazil from 1995 and 1998. The analysis reveals that such Ministry (MARE) has found cooperation from the strategic components at the innermost bureaucracy for the fiscal adjust while the institutional change has not gotten the same success. Such differential support has taken MARE to its extinction and to the later transformation of the State reform policy four years after its creation. This case shows clearly such argument and proposes, based on the permanent failure theory, an explanation on how the administrative reforms have represented sequential failure cases, particularly the administrative reforms from the 1990's, which centered in the "cost less and work better" idea.

Les politiques de réforme administrative sont reconnues comme étant des cas typiques de politiques publiques qui, fréquemment, n'atteignent pas leurs objectifs. L'expérience indique un effort continu de gouvernements dans le sens de mettre en œuvre de "nouvelles politiques" pour lutter contre les problèmes chroniques de performance des apparats bureaucratiques. Les réformes administratives sont formulées et, rapidement, mal conduites, modifiées ou abandonnées. La littérature internationale reconnaît et fournit un grand ensemble d'explications pour ce phénomène. Cet article fournit une explication additionnelle, centrée sur l'impossibilité de coopération entre les acteurs stratégiques pour l'ajustement fiscal et le changement institutionnel. Nous discutons, également, comment un tel phénomène a eu lieu dans le cas de la mise en œuvre de la réforme administrative par le Ministère de l'Administration Fédérale et de la Réforme de l'État - MARE, entre 1995 et 1998 au Brésil. L'analyse révèle que le MARE a obtenu la coopération des acteurs stratégiques à l'intérieur de la bureaucratie pour l'ajustement fiscal, tandis que le changement institutionnel n'a pas obtenu le même succès. Cet appui différencié a conduit le MARE à son extinction et, postérieurement, à la transformation de la politique de réforme de l'État, quatre ans après sa création. Ce cas illustre parfaitement l'argument et lance, en se fondant sur la théorie de la faille permanente, une explication de pourquoi les réformes administratives et, en particulier, les réformes administratives en cours dans les années 1990, centrées sur l'idée de cost less and work better, représentent des cas de rupture séquentielle.

Este artigo analisa padrões de respostas de organizações da administração direta do Poder Executivo Federal brasileiro a políticas de ajuste fiscal nos anos 90. Baseada no argumento dos jogos repetidos de informação incompleta, a análise objetiva explicar porque, mesmo diante de políticas que visam a reduzir o tamanho e os gastos governamentais, os gastos com pessoal e o número de funcionários tendem a persistir no tempo.

This article analyses patterns of answers from organizations of direct management of Brazilian Federal Executive power to policies of fiscal adjustment in the 1990's. Based in the argument of repeated games of incomplete information, the analysis aims to show and explain why, even when faced with policies attempting to reduce the size of governamental expenditure, expenses with personnel and the number of functionaries tend to persist in time.

Cet article analyse les modalités de réponses des organisations de l'administration directe du Pouvoir Exécutif Fédéral brésilien qui ont été données à la politique d'ajustement fiscal dans les années 90. En s'appuyant sur l'argument des jeux répétés d'information incomplète, cette analyse vise à montrer et à expliquer pourquoi les dépenses avec les fonctionnaires et le nombre de fonctionnaires ont tendance à persister même si des politiques visant à réduire l'ampleur et les dépenses du gouvernement sont mises en place.